I see.
That combination is not recommended as it would defeat the purpose of the 2FA.
• Attacker obtains access to the email account of the user
• Attacker initiates a password reset and obtains access to the application account
• Wants to perform critical transaction, 2FA is triggered and the OTP is sent to the email account of the user (which the attacker has access to)
• 2FA challenge is defeated by the attacker
The 2FA should be a mechanism to protect the user account in case the first factor is breached. If you use email+password, the second factor should should not rely on email as well. How about one of these
MFA methods.
To design robust security, consider combining of these:
• Something you know (password, security question, email password)
• Something you are (face id, fingerprint id)
• Something you have (yubikey, recovery codes, smartphone)